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Abstract 
An important aspect of contemporary European policy-making is public 
participation. The European Commission increasingly mandates its Member 
States to involve the general public in policy-making through public participation. 
Public participation is generally considered to improve the legitimacy and 
democracy of the policy-making process and its outcomes. However, mandated 
public participation creates severe difficulties for Member States whose policy-
making process may be characterized as a (neo)corporatist system of interest 
representation. This paper presents the case of the implementation of the EU 
Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands, aiming to highlight these 
difficulties, to provide an example of how a Member State may cope with forced 
public participation in a (neo)corporatist environment, and to question whether 
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and, if so, how mandated public participation actually results in a more 
democratic and legitimate policy-making process. 
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Introduction 
Public participation is gaining increasing attention in European environmental 
policy-making. The European Commission (EC) considers public participation to 
be key for interest representation, especially in environmental and water policy 
(e.g. EC, 2000, 2001; EC, 2003a, 2003b). In general, public participation is 
considered to be a strategy to increase the legitimacy, democracy, quality, 
effectiveness and efficiency of the public policy-making process and its policy 
outcomes (Bischop & Davis, 2002; Giddens, 2000; Offe, 1984).  
 In the first years of this century, public participation in the EU was found to 
‘[remain] stubbornly low, public support for it is highly variable across the 
Member States, and public understanding of the EU is somewhat 
patchy’(Greenwood, 2011: 5). This paper discusses an EC solution for increasing 
public participation across the Member States: ‘mandated public participation’. By 
the term ‘mandated public participation’, we refer to a situation in which the EC 
requires the Member States to ensure public participation when implementing 
policies. We address an illustrative case: the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) (EC, 2000) in the Netherlands. This EC directive 
aims to improve water quality throughout Europe. The WFD is an intriguing case, 
as it was the first piece of EC legislation that forced the Member States to ensure 
public participation through information sharing, consultation, and the 
involvement of the public in policy-making and implementation (cf. Newig, Pahl-
Wostl, & Sigel, 2005).  
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 We question, however, how this requirement for public participation, and 
especially the involvement of the public, fits with the Member States’ approach to 
interest representation within their policy-making processes. After all, the 
different Member States have different institutionalized traditions and approaches 
for the representation of different interests. Using a broad brush of 
generalization, these lie on a sliding scale from pluralist to corporate systems of 
interest representation (e.g. Bischop & Davis, 2002). Public participation through 
involving the public, however, is a typical pluralist tool for interest representation 
that, at first glance, seems to clash with corporate systems (e.g. Greenwood, 
2011). Mandated public participation may then raise serious concerns for EU 
Member States with corporate systems of interest representation. 
 In order to understand whether there is indeed a clash between mandated 
public participation and corporatist systems of interest representation, we discuss 
the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands; the Netherlands is a typical 
example of a country with a corporate system (Woldendorp & Keman, 2007). The 
Netherlands further is a particularly interesting case to study. Between 2000 and 
2009 it invested a great deal of time and effort in meeting the EC’s requirement 
for public participation in implementing the WFD, and is assessed positively by 
the EC for doing so (EC, 2012a). At first glance the Netherlands thus do conflict 
with our hypothesis. As such it provides us with a ‘telling’ case from which 
valuable insights and lessons may be drawn (McKeown, 2004).   
This paper is structured as follows. We start with a brief discussion of the 
WFD, and focus especially on the relevance of the WFD as the first piece of EC 
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legislation that actually mandates Member States to achieve public participation. 
We continue with a brief discussion of corporate and pluralist systems of interest 
representation, and the role of public participation within these systems. We then 
discuss the Dutch case, in a discussion based on a series of in-depth interviews 
(n=53) and an online survey questionnaire (n=298). Finally, we conclude this 
article by discussing the main lessons learnt. 
 
The Water Framework Directive and public participation 
The background, history and content of the WFD have been discussed at great 
length elsewhere (e.g. Hoornbeek, 2004; Kaika & Page, 2003; Page & Kaika, 
2003)1; here we just discuss those aspects of the WFD that are relevant for our 
study. 
 The WFD aims for ‘good ecological status’ and ‘good chemical status’ for 
waters in Europe, by a set deadline of 22 December 2015 (EC, 2000, annex V 
and IX). What is innovative about the WFD is the organization of water 
management around river basins instead of around existing political or 
administrative boundaries which was the situation prior to its implementation 
(also, Page & Kaika, 2003). A river basin is a natural geographical and 
hydrological unit that defines a river; a unit that may – and often does – cross 
national borders and that requires coordination and cooperation between existing 
administrative units of the Member States.  
 The WFD requires a Member State to draw up a river basin management 
plan for each river basin within its national boundaries. The plan should be a 
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detailed account of how the goals of the WFD are to be reached in a Member 
State before the deadline. For our study it is relevant to stress once more that the 
WFD is the first European Directive that explicitly mandates Member States to 
ensure public participation as part of the policy-making process (the development 
of river basin management plans). Preamble 14 to the WFD (referred to as 
Article 14) provides a clear rationale for public participation: ‘The success of [the 
WFD] relies on close cooperation and coherent action at Community, Member 
State and local level as well as on information, consultation and involvement of 
the public, including users’ (EC, 2000: 2; see also, EU Working Group on Public 
Participation, 2002: 21). Article 14 mentions three forms of public participation 
(EC, 2000: 16): information supply, consultation and active involvement. 
Information supply and consultation have to be ensured by the Member States, 
while active involvement is encouraged but not required by the EC (EU Working 
Group on Public Participation, 2002: 17).  
 Article 14 leaves much room for interpretation by the Member States – as 
do many provisions of the WFD. Various working groups have drawn up so-
called implementation strategies aiming to support Member States in the 
implementation of the WFD. One of these groups, the informal Working Group on 
Public Participation, focused on public participation; this group consisted of 
representatives of a number of Member States and the EC. We consider their 
final document (EU Working Group on Public Participation, 2002), a source that 
provides valuable additional information on the role of public participation in the 
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implementation of the WFD – but that is also an additional ‘official’ view of the 
Commission on public participation in the implementation of the WFD. 
The EU Working Group on Public Participation defines public participation 
as: ‘allowing people to influence the outcome of plans and working processes’ 
(EU Working Group on Public Participation, 2002: 19). According to this Working 
Group ‘the main purpose for public participation is to improve decision-making, 
by ensuring that decisions are soundly based on shared knowledge, experiences 
and scientific evidence, that decisions are influenced by the views and 
experience of those affected by them, that innovative and creative options are 
considered and that new arrangements are workable, and acceptable to the 
public’ (EU Working Group on Public Participation, 2002: 21). 
 For the Member States the open-ended structure of Article 14 results in at 
least two challenging issues. First, it does not state who should be involved in 
this process of public participation – it refers to ‘all interested parties in the 
implementation of [the WFD]’ (EC, 2000: 16). Following a discussion of the EU 
Working Group on Public Participation we find that ‘interested parties’ include 
both stakeholders and the public (EU Working Group on Public Participation, 
2002).  
Second, the WFD does not pre-determine at what scale public 
participation should take place. Nevertheless, from Article 14 it may be 
concluded that public participation is relevant at all scales where activities take 
place to implement the WFD – the areas where actual measures are taken, but 
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also the areas where the impact of such measures is felt (cf. EU Working Group 
on Public Participation, 2002: 26).  
 
Mandated public participation and corporate systems of interest 
representation 
Moreover, the requirement for public participation may not only challenge the 
Member States, but it may even clash with the traditional approaches of some of 
them towards involving the public and other stakeholders in policy-making and 
implementation – more broadly referred to as interest representation (Arnstein, 
1969; Bischop & Davis, 2002; Greenwood, 2011). This seems to be the case 
especially in corporatist systems of interest representation. 
 Generally speaking, two overarching systems of interest representation 
can be distinguished: pluralism and corporatism. We understand that these 
concepts are widely contested and debated, and we simply use them to refer to 
differences in the Member States’ approaches to interest representation (for 
further discussions on the concepts see, among others,  Cohen & Pavoncello, 
1987; Dahl, 1978; G. Jordan, 1984; Molina & Rhodes, 2002; Smith, 1990). 
Corporatism is generally used to refer to a system of interest representation:  
 
in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the state, and granted a deliberate representational 
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monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demand and supports (Schmitter, 1974: 94-5).  
 
The advantages of corporatism are expected to come from the long ‘working 
relationship’ between interest groups and the State: extreme demands tend to be 
moderated as the parties will meet each other again some other time; and 
decision making might be expedited since the parties know each other and do 
not have to spend time on exploring one another’s character and area of interest 
(cf. Magagna, 1988). 
Then, pluralism refers to a system of interest representation: 
 
in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified 
number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically 
ordered, and self-determined (as to the type and scope of interest) 
categories that are not specifically licensed, recognized, subsidized 
or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation 
by the state and that do not exercise a monopoly of representational 
activity within their respective categories (Schmitter, 1977: 9).  
 
Corporatism is sometimes criticised for leading to a lack of meaningful 
participation of the public in policy-making and implementation, and the 
advantage of pluralism is the mere fact that anyone who has the resources to do 
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so can gain representation of her or his interests and access to State power. As 
such, pluralism is sometimes considered to be more democratic than corporatism 
(cf. Hunold, 2001; Magagna, 1988). Further, it may be argued that public 
participation, as discussed in the WFD, and especially the involvement of the 
public, fits well with the open structure of pluralist systems of interest 
representation, but less well with the more closed structure of corporatist 
systems (e.g. Greenwood, 2011). In the long run this EC requirement for public 
participation may change Member States’ systems of interest representation. Or, 
in the eyes of some scholars, ‘the Commission is often a deliberate instigator of 
pluralism’ (Wallace, 1997: 13). 
This raises the question of how countries characterized by corporate 
systems of interest representation deal with ‘mandated’ public participation. After 
all, governments cannot change their systems of interest representation 
overnight. The EC’s requirement is expected to result in incremental changes to 
existing systems of interest representation. In what follows we discuss how 
mandated public participation was dealt with in the Netherlands, a typical 
example of a country with a corporate system of interest representation.2 As 
already highlighted, the Netherlands is a particularly interesting case to study. 
Between 2000 and 2009 it invested a great deal of time and effort in meeting the 
EC’s requirement for public participation, which we will discuss in what follows; 
and, is assessed positively by the EC for doing so: ‘Public participation has been 
carried out very extensively [in the Netherlands], and stakeholder involvement 
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seems to be of great importance through the entire RBM development process’ 
(EC, 2012a). At first glance the Netherlands do thus conflict with our hypothesis. 
 
 
Research approach 
The research presented here is part of an analysis of the implementation of the 
WFD in the Netherlands which was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of 
Traffic, Public Works and Water Management (Anonymous, 2010). One of the 
aspects covered in this analysis was public participation, and especially the 
involvement of the public. We carried out this analysis between January and July 
2010. In order to understand the implementation of public participation and its 
effects we questioned: (i) which parties were involved; (ii) how those parties were 
involved; and (iii) how close those parties were to the actual decision making. 
We used a four-step approach for data collection and validation of 
findings. First, we built a story-line and topic list of the implementation process, 
based on an extensive study of existing documentation (cf. Venesson, 2008). 
The story-line consisted of a chronological overview of the implementation 
process: the decisions made, the actors involved, the critiques expressed, the 
reports produced, etc. The topic list summed up topics such as the specific 
implementation structure, a number of reports that either hampered or supported 
the implementation process, the different groups of stakeholders involved in the 
process, etc. (these are all discussed later in this article). We discussed this 
story-line and topic list in three interviews with key representatives of the 
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implementation process – a former director at the Dutch Ministry of Traffic, Public 
Works and Water Management responsible for the implementation of the WFD; a 
representative from a non-governmental organization; and a former Dutch 
lobbyist at the EC. 
 Second, based on the story-line, topic list and interviews, we carried out a 
series of 50 semi-structured and open-ended interviews with key players in the 
implementation process (cf. McCracken, 1988; Richards, 1996). We targeted 
three groups of interviewees, who represented a wide range of stakeholders at 
national, regional and local levels. The interviewees were national, regional and 
local policy-makers and government representatives (from Ministries, provinces, 
municipalities and Water Boards), specific interest group representatives 
(farmers and environmentalists), and industry stakeholder representatives 
(drinking water suppliers and land developers). Interviews were analysed using a 
structured coding scheme; inter-coder reliability tests were carried out by the 
various researchers involved (cf. Seale & Silverman, 1997; Silverman, 2001). 
 Third, the interviews provided the questions for an online survey 
questionnaire (cf. Wright, 2005). We targeted a wide range of actors involved in 
the implementation process: public officials at various levels of government, 
private sector and NGO representatives, interest group representatives, and the 
like. We asked 1,172 people to respond, of whom 298 filled out the questionnaire 
(response: 25.4%). 
 Fourth, and finally, based on an analysis of both the quantitative and the 
qualitative data we drew up an interim research report. Findings from this report 
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were presented and discussed in three expert meetings with key actors from 
government, NGOs, and other stakeholder organizations and interest groups. 
During the expert meetings, our findings were discussed and validated. 
Additional data from the meetings were processed in the final analysis. 
 
Implementing the Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands: 
significant institutional changes 
The Netherlands is renowned for its long history of water policy. Over the years – 
or, rather, centuries – a complex institutional structure has developed. (for good 
overviews of the history of Dutch water policy and past and current institutional 
structure see, Havekes, Koemans, Lazaroms, Poos, & Uijterlinde, 2004; Kuks, 
2002). The pre-WFD institutional setting may be considered to be highly 
corporatist. That is, interest representation was put into practice by a small 
number of organizations, which were hierarchically ordered and recognized by 
the Dutch national government. Relevant actors in this pre-WFD institutional 
setting were the Association of Water Boards, the Association of Municipalities, 
the Association of Provinces, and a small number of stakeholder organizations 
(representing farmers, landowners and environmentalists) who promoted the 
interests of their members at a national and European level (Havekes et al., 
2004; Kuks, 2002). 
 This pre-WFD corporatist structure of interest representation in the 
Netherlands partly fits the EC’s requirement for public participation as laid down 
in Article 14 of the WFD and as interpreted by the EU Working Group on Public 
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Participation. After all, the Working Group interprets the wording ‘all interested 
parties in the implementation of [the WFD]’ (EC, 2000: 16) to mean two groups: 
stakeholders and the public (EU Working Group on Public Participation, 2002). 
The interests of stakeholders were represented under the pre-WFD institutional 
structure through associations and interest groups. Yet there is no direct 
representation of individual stakeholders, or the public in general, in the pre-WFD 
institutional structure. 
 
Towards broader stakeholder and public representation 
How then has the Netherlands met the EC’s requirement for public participation, 
and especially the involvement of the general public? After all, based on our 
literature review we hypothesized that (mandated) public participation conflicts 
with corporatist systems of interest representation. In order to understand how 
the Ministry of Water, Public Works and Transport3 (from here on referred to as 
‘the Ministry’) has dealt with this puzzle, we have to look closely at the 
implementation structure. 
 The Ministry introduced a complex organizational structure to implement 
the WFD. The complex structure was necessary in order to bring together all 
relevant stakeholders of the former institutional structure for water policy in the 
Netherlands into the new river basin based structure. That is, a change had to be 
made from a structure following traditional geographical boundaries (i.e. 12 
Provinces, 26 Water Boards, and about 470 Municipalities) to a structure based 
on seven (sub)river basins. Furthermore, the Ministry quickly understood that it 
15 
 
did not have sufficient expertise to implement the WFD itself – note that WFD 
Article 3 requires the Member States to identify an ‘appropriate competent 
authority’ for the application of the WFD for each river basin (EC, 2000: 8). In the 
Netherlands the Ministry was appointed as this authority. Figure 1 represents the 
organizational structure. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – simplified overview of the Dutch WFD implementation structure 
(Source: Anonymous, 2010) 
 
Put simply, the organizational structure for the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands consisted of a set of columns: a national column and seven regional 
columns – one per (sub)river basin. This structure was designed and 
implemented by the Ministry in collaboration with the relevant stakeholders. The 
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national column was the arena for debates between representatives of national 
associations, ministerial departments and the Secretary of State responsible for 
the WFD implementation. The top of this column is key in interest representation: 
it is here that representatives of national associations had direct contact with the 
Secretary of State. It is also here that the framework for the implementation at 
(sub)river basin level was set. All other layers of this column may be considered 
preparatory – i.e., the two lower layers (Associations & Ministries and the 
Preparatory Committee) provided input for the debates at the top of the column; 
the Theme Groups provided input to the Preparatory Committee; and the 
Working Groups provided input to the Theme Groups. Interestingly, a separate 
arena was organized in parallel with the top of the national column. Here we find 
an arena in which national interest groups (i.e., groups representing industry, 
commerce, nature and the environment, and leisure) advised the Secretary of 
State on the implementation of the WFD. 
 The regional columns were the arenas for debates at the (sub)river basin 
level. In these columns we find that a regular debate took place between the 
chairs of the columns and the Secretary of State. The columns themselves were 
governed by administrators in the Provinces and Water Boards. These 
administrators took decisions on the implementation at (sub)river basin level. In 
doing this they were supported by civil servants from their own organizations. 
These were, in their turn, supported by Product Teams – comparable to the 
Theme Groups in the national column. A specific role was assigned to Feedback 
Groups – a mixture of representatives of prominent land owners (mostly nature 
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and environmental conservation organizations) and interest groups (i.e., groups 
representing industry, agriculture, commerce and leisure). The formal function of 
these groups was to provide input to the Product Teams.  
 This implementation structure clearly shows an understanding of the 
relevance of Article 14 of the WFD (public participation) in the Netherlands: 
interest representation is organized at various levels. Besides this formal 
structure, another specific approach was chosen to meet the EC’s demands for 
public participation: 140 so-called ‘Area Processes’ were started, to involve 
citizens and local interest groups in the WFD implementation process.  
 However, another way of looking at this implementation structure is to see 
it as more or less continuing the traditional institutional setting (with the national 
column), and adding two new structures , the regional columns and the Area 
Processes, to aim to meet Article 14. This ‘layering’ of new to old institutions is 
not unique to the Dutch case (cf. Kampa, Kranz, & Hansen, 2003; Slavíková & 
Jílková, 2011) and brings to the fore questions of redundancy, interdependency, 
and the impact of such overlapping institutions (cf. Landau, 1969; Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2010). 
 
Experiences of involving ‘the public’ 
Although the EC in their assessment of the WFD implementation process speaks 
positively about public participation in the WFD implementation processes of the 
Netherlands (EC, 2012a), our respondents generally assess public participation 
in the Netherlands as a failure. Active citizen participation started late in the 
18 
 
implementation process, in 2008. This late start appears to be an outcome of an 
initial long struggle to develop the implementation structure as illustrated in 
Figure 1, and then the various involved parties having difficulty in getting used to 
it – that is, in accepting new power balances, developing new working structures, 
and starting new working relationships. Note further that citizens, as such, were 
not included in this implementation structure. 
 In 2007 the Ministry issued a report on the then first five years of the WFD 
implementation process. In this report the involvement of the public in the WFD 
implementation process was evaluated as negative: ‘Almost all respondents [in 
the Ministry’s study] indicate that during this first phase of implementing the WFD 
public participation has been mostly absent’ (Ministry of WPW&T, 2007, 24). The 
report further mentions that most respondents in the study saw the need for 
public participation, but that active involvement of the public was not planned to 
start before 2008. 
By 2008, citizens (or, to use the EU Working Group on Public 
Participation’s wording, ‘the public’) were already faced with a large quantity of 
information through websites, newsletters, and brochures. Yet this supply of 
information may be considered to be a passive involvement of citizens – it is only 
a one-way stream of information. The active forms of involvement of citizens, 
through consultation or activities with a greater reach, which started later in the 
process, were limited. Citizens could participate in Area Processes or visit a 
series of seven information meetings throughout the Netherlands – that is, one 
meeting for each (sub)river basin. Yet few did so.  
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This low participation of citizens in Area Processes may partly be an 
outcome of their goals (cf. MB Advies, 2009). Area Processes were started to 
share local experiences of the WFD Implementation, to assess whether or not 
local solutions were ‘WFD proof’, and to gain insight into the various local 
measures taken throughout the Netherlands and their overall costs. These goals 
are relevant to landowners, farmers, and the like, so our interviewees explained, 
but they hardly appeal to citizens. Further, by 2008 many decisions had already 
been taken, which raises questions as to how meaningful the involvement of the 
public was at that point in time. Area Processes were mostly joined by interest 
groups – see, further, the discussion below.  
Furthermore, citizens appeared to have limited interest in visiting the 
information meetings that were organized in parallel to the Area Processes. An 
anecdote is illustrative here: one of our interviewees recalled one of these 
meetings. Twelve people attended the meeting, but eleven of them were 
professionally involved in the WFD implementation. When they quizzed number 
twelve, they found that she was one of our researchers (in an earlier position), 
who had joined the meeting out of research interest. In short, no citizen attended 
this particular meeting – and the interviewees recalled similar experiences with 
other meetings. Interviewees shared an opinion that citizens are not interested in 
complex water issues when these are still vague and in policy papers. Following 
interview accounts, citizens start caring about such issues once the policies are 
implemented – e.g. once their house is due to be demolished because of the 
construction of a dike (for comparable experiences, see Slavíková & Jílková, 
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2011; Trajekovic, Kolakovic, & Ignjatovic, 2005). Also, one should ask to what 
extent citizens can get involved when they have only one chance to attend a 
meeting relating to their (sub)river basin, and how a citizen’s voice makes it all 
the way up to the actual decision making process. After all, these meetings, 
which were not even included in the Dutch implementation structure (see Figure 
1), took place at a great distance from the Secretary of State. One of our 
interviewees’ criticism of these meetings is illustrative here: ‘not much should be 
expected from putting a tablecloth on a table, sitting some bureaucrats on one 
end of it, and hoping that citizens will come to discuss matters at the other end of 
the table.’  
 To conclude, the chosen approach to involving the public – town-hall 
meetings and printed documentation – seems out of date. In addition to these 
traditional approaches, much information was provided through websites. Web-
based public participation is generally considered to improve traditional public 
participation; yet, web-based public participation has been shown to be limited 
when potential participants have restricted or no internet access, or have only 
partial knowledge of operating computers and websites, or when the interface of 
the website is too complex (Stern, Gudes, & Svoray, 2009). Besides, the Dutch 
websites provided few if any possibilities for citizens to use their voices actively, 
because the websites mostly just contained information (for comparable 
experiences, see Kampa et al., 2003). As Bischop and Davis had already noted, 
information campaigns are ‘hardly meaningful participation, since the flow is only 
one-way’ (Bischop & Davis, 2002: 20). Having said that, only a small majority of 
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our respondents (51%, n= 266) feel that more active citizen involvement is 
needed in (future) WFD implementation processes. 
 
Experiences of involving ‘stakeholders’ 
Although our data provides rather limited insights into the (active) involvement of 
citizens in the Dutch case, for the simple reason that there was hardly any 
involvement, more insight was gained into the involvement of stakeholders such 
as land owners, Water Boards, and interest groups. These stakeholders were 
involved in the implementation process through Feedback Groups and Area 
Processes, and their national representative bodies were involved in the national 
column of the implementation structure (see Figure 1). In the same way as active 
citizen involvement, these forms of participation faced severe criticism from our 
respondents. 
First, Feedback Groups were introduced as the most prominent platform 
both for informing stakeholders in the (sub)river basins on the implementation 
process, and for giving these stakeholders a voice in the process (cf. Aquaterra, 
2008). However, our respondents considered the Feedback Groups to be 
platforms where stakeholders just obtained information and were not given much 
chance to express their wishes and needs (also, IBT, 2006). Participants in the 
Feedback Groups mentioned the ‘cosmetic’ nature of their role in the 
consultation. As one of our interviewees put it, ‘our comments were added to 
formal policy documents, but are not reflected in policy’.  Furthermore, the 
Feedback Groups were not formally included in the implementation structure 
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(see Figure 1), but were considered to be advisory bodies for it. This significantly 
distances them from the real centre of power within the implementation process. 
As an interviewee stated, ‘although we were able to find consensus on a regional 
level, the distance between us [regional interest groups] and the Secretary of 
State was too large’. A majority of the respondents from the Feedback Groups 
considered that these groups had insufficient power in the implementation 
process (51.3%, n=39). 
These experiences and considerations directly relate to what Arnstein 
(1969) refers to as ‘empty rituals’. Although being consulted is an easy way to be 
involved in the policy process, stakeholders in this role do not have to affect the 
outcome of the process per se (Arnstein, 1969; A. G. Jordan & Richardson, 
1987). The frustration of our interviewees sounded somewhat familiar: 
‘participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process 
for the powerless’ (Arnstein, 1969: 216). Arnstein clearly places informing and 
consultation in the category of tokenism: ‘the groundrules allow have-nots to 
advise, but retain for the powerholders the continued right to decide’ (Arnstein, 
1969: 217). 
Second, Area Processes were, as discussed before, set up to share local 
experiences on the WFD implementation, to assess whether or not local 
solutions were ‘WFD proof’, and to gain insight into the various local measures 
taken throughout the Netherlands and their overall costs. The Water Boards were 
responsible for the initialization of these processes, which resulted in major 
differences in the various Area Processes. Furthermore, early on in the WFD 
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implementation process the Water Boards wondered exactly what was meant by 
public participation, who should be involved and at what level. In certain regions, 
interviewees explained, this resulted in a late start to the Area Processes and, 
under the strict deadlines of the WFD, a lack of time for structural discussions. 
One interviewee recalled: ‘We only had three meetings to come to decisions. We 
didn’t have time to sort things out if anyone disagreed with them.’ 
Further, severe criticism of the wide range of actors involved in such Area 
Processes was expressed. Bringing together a wide range of stakeholders 
makes it difficult actually to come to agreement on the issues, and agreements 
were felt to be ‘watered down compromises between a wide range of actors’. 
Especially in water policy, the wishes and needs of different interest groups – for 
instance, those of farmers and ecologists – might clash, and in the Netherlands 
especially these two groups did clash early on in the implementation process (cf. 
van der Bolt et al., 2003). Also, like the Feedback Groups, the Area Processes 
may be considered as only giving advice to the formal decision making process. 
They are relatively distanced from the centre of power. It is therefore not 
surprising that our respondents wonder whether this type of consultation should 
be used in future policy-making processes (48%, n=116, think it should). 
Third, besides these forms of direct involvement at a local level, 
stakeholders were also involved in the implementation process through their 
national representative bodies (in the national column, see Figure 1). As 
discussed earlier, this national column by and large reflects the traditional 
institutional setting of interest representation. Again, this structure leaves 
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individual organizations relatively remote from the actual centre of power, as their 
voice has to travel through the national representative bodies before reaching the 
Secretary of State.  
Also, the in-built redundancy of the national column and regional columns 
resulted in a doubling of the policy arenas where the various interested actors 
could have their voice heard. Some of our respondents were very frustrated by 
the fact that they had to attend many meetings in different policy arenas, which 
led to severe staffing problems for the smaller interest groups. Here the complex 
implementation structure, with a wide range of formal consultation platforms, in-
built redundancy and duplication, negatively affects public participation: when 
interest groups cannot represent themselves and use their voice, they are not 
heard. As one of the interviewees noted: ‘for staffless interest groups there is a 
lot of pressure on its members, especially given the strict timeframe and the 
ocean of documents we had to deal with’. Other interviewees described the in-
built redundancy as ‘an administrative overload’. Moreover, a number of 
respondents representing regional interest groups considered that the in-built 
redundancy blurred the power relationships and allowed the Ministry ‘to play 
chess on two different boards’. They also criticized the Ministry for being more 
involved in the national than in the regional columns: ‘decisions were made in the 
national column, without waiting for the regional columns to give their opinions’. A 
large majority of these respondents assess their influence on the implementation 
process as negative (95%, n=18). 
25 
 
Finally, during the interviews we repeatedly noticed interviewees 
discussing the tension between thoroughness and timeliness. The WFD puts the 
Member States in a difficult position: on the one hand it requires timely 
implementation and provides a strict timeframe; on the other hand it requires 
thorough public participation (Article 14 WFD). The greater the number of parties 
involved in a policy-making process, however, the longer it takes actually to 
implement the policy. And time was short during the WFD implementation. Both 
in the Feedback Groups and in the Area Processes the choices made may be 
traced back to exactly this dilemma. As an Area Process Coordinator mentioned 
during an interview: ‘At first we aimed for a very democratic and collaborative 
process. Yet, this took too many meetings. Over time the strategy was changed. 
The Water Board took over and set the goals.’ Another interviewee mentioned: 
‘Time was leading, and this held for interest groups as well. Everyone was 
allowed to get on board, but not everyone did.’ As discussed above, not all 
interest groups had the means or the staff to meet the strict timeframe and attend 
all the relevant meetings. As a result, as the interviewees noted, not all interest 
groups support the river basin management plans, which calls into question the 
legitimacy and democracy of the implementation process and the plans (cf. 
Bischop & Davis, 2002). 
To conclude, through both Feedback Groups and Area Processes interest 
groups had only an advisory role in the implementation process. Their insights, 
expressed wishes and needs had to travel a long way to the centre of power 
before making it into policy documents. According to our respondents, most 
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formal power remained where it was traditionally based: in the national column, a 
structure that largely reflects the traditional institutional arrangement of water 
policy in the Netherlands. When asked whether the Dutch WFD policies reflect 
the voice of interest groups, or stakeholders in the terminology of the EU Working 
Group on Public Participation, a majority of administrators and civil servants 
stated that they do (respectively 81%, n=13; and 74%, n=123); however, a 
majority of the representatives of these interest groups feel these policies do not 
reflect their voices (59%, n=40) – a statistically significant difference between the 
groups (Chi2=24.415; df=2; p<0.001; Cramer’s V=0.321).  
 
Conclusion and discussion 
This paper addressed the increasing attention that is being paid to public 
participation in European environmental policy-making. It specifically addressed 
the EC’s move towards what we termed mandated public participation in 
response to a low level of public participation in the Member States’ policy-
making processes in the early years of this century (cf. Greenwood, 2011).  
 Based on a review of the literature on corporatist and pluralist forms of 
interest representation, we argued that the pluralist tool of public participation 
may very well clash with the more corporatist systems of interest representation 
of some of the Member States. We studied the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands to test this hypothesis. This case is of interest as (i) the country is 
generally considered to have a typical example of a corporatist system of interest 
representation (Woldendorp & Keman, 2007); (ii) the Netherlands has invested 
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much time and effort in meeting the EC’s requirement to ensure public 
participation; (iii) public participation in the Dutch case is assessed positively in a 
recent EC evaluation of the WFD implementation in the various Member States 
(EC, 2012a, 2012b); yet, public participation in the WFD implementation process 
of the Netherlands is assessed negatively by our respondents. As such the 
country provides us with a telling case from which important lessons may be 
drawn. Such lessons are of relevance. That is, it took the EC almost three years 
(since the formal end of the first phase of the implementation of the WFD) to 
assess whether or not the Member States have or have not sufficiently met the 
requirement for public participation; and as the Dutch case highlights, this 
assessment is contestable. How then can the Member States strengthen their 
approaches to public participation for the second phase of implementing the 
WFD, which ends in December 2015? 
We understand that a single country study has limitations. In what follows 
we therefore do not claim empirical generalizability. The lessons we present may 
best be understood as analytical or moderatum generalizations (Payne & 
Williams, 2005):  bounded insights and lessons on mandated public participation 
that may be similar, but not identical, to what is found in other EU Member States 
with corporatist systems of interest representation. 
First, contrary to our expectation, the Dutch corporatist system of interest 
representation does not clash with public participation. Yet, as our study showed, 
the complex combined implementation structure of overlapping and redundant 
policy arenas was found to result in serious issues. That is, from the study we 
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learned that de jure the Netherlands has succeeded in meeting the EC’s 
requirement for public participation. De facto, however, the Netherlands has 
failed to do so: interviewees and survey respondents feel that the active 
involvement of the public was unsuccessful, and the stakeholders themselves do 
not see their voice represented in the policy documents that are the result of the 
implementation process. Further, the consultative nature of the approaches 
chosen – a series of information and consultation meetings and information 
supply, the formation of Feedback Groups, and Area Processes – were 
considered to be a one-way flow of information and not a true sharing of political 
power (see also Bischop & Davis, 2002). 
 Second, in the Netherlands the EC’s requirement for public participation 
resulted in a time-consuming process of developing an implementation structure 
that added a new institutional setting (regional columns) to a more or less 
unchanged traditional institutional structure of water policy (the national column) 
– see Figure 1. Such layering may be preferable to a full replacement of an 
existing institutional setting if powerful actors remain and existing power 
relationships are valued. Further, (most) countries simply cannot change their 
system of interest representation overnight (cf. Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Our 
respondents stressed that in the Netherlands it has taken individuals and 
organizations a great deal of time to get used to the new institutional setting, and 
to build new relationships; time that could not be used for effective public 
participation. 
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 Third, following the EU Working Group on Public Participation, public 
participation implies involving ‘stakeholders’ and ‘the public’ (EU Working Group 
on Public Participation, 2002). Yet involving the public is somewhat foreign to 
corporatist systems of interest representation. As the Dutch case shows, in a 
country with a weaker history of public participation public officials may enter into 
too technocratic an application of the tool – i.e. applying it without actually 
understanding its possibilities or value (see also Stirling, 2004). The seven 
information meetings throughout the Netherlands may de jure be considered to 
represent involvement of the public; in practice, their outcomes may be 
questioned. 
 Fourth and finally, particularly where there is a corporatist system of 
interest representation, one may wonder whether mandated public participation 
strengthens or weakens democracy. After all, with a corporatist system of interest 
representation the interests of many groups are already represented by various 
organizations. We expect that the Dutch approach of layering a new institutional 
setting into an existing traditional institutional setting of water policy is not unique 
(cf. Kampa et al., 2003; Slavíková & Jílková, 2011). Such layering may then lead 
to the danger of the overrepresentation of certain groups within the 
implementation process (see also Baiocchi, 2005). As one of our interviewees 
noted: ‘it is always the same people who attend the meetings’. The more these 
groups or individuals who are actively involved use their voice, the weaker is the 
unheard voice of those not attending the meetings – whether they fail to attend 
because they lack interest, or because they lack the means to do so.  
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To conclude, this article identifies a number of issues resulting from the 
EC’s move towards mandated public participation in environmental policy-
making. We expect that these are but a few examples of a larger set of issues 
that may result from mandated public participation – although we are aware of 
the caveats of our research approach. This asks for more critical studies than 
those currently provided on the actual impact of mandated public participation 
(e.g., EC, 2012a, 2012b). More empirical research (cross-country, cross-
sectorial) is needed to gain a better understanding of the merits and 
shortcomings of mandated public participation. Through this paper we aim 
merely to put the topic on the research agenda. 
 
Endnotes 
1. See also the EU website on the WFD: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/index_en.html. 
2. It should be noted that both corporatism and pluralism are ideals. No country 
should be considered to be either corporatist or pluralistic. Nevertheless, some 
consensus exists on the classification of EU Member States on a ‘corporatism–
pluralism’ scale. In particular, the northern Member States of the European Union 
– including the Netherlands (Magagna, 1988; Paloheimo, 1984; Siaroff, 1999; 
Woldendorp & Keman, 2007) – are considered to have more corporatist systems 
of interest representation (Damgaard & Eliassen, 1978; Pallesen, 2006). 
3. This was the name of the responsible Ministry when we carried out our 
research. After the 2010 elections a new Ministry became responsible for water 
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policy in the Netherlands: the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. The 
latter Ministry is a combination of the former ministry of Traffic, Public Works and 
Water Management and the Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning and the 
Environment. 
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